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pears robust and signiﬁcantly negative only for countries with a relatively low military
expenditure ratio. While the externality eﬀect appears positive in this subgroup of
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11 Introduction
The relation between economic well-being and resources absorbed by the military1 has been
widely debated among defense economists during the last decades. The discussion has been
centered on the question whether the losses through crowding out of resources invested in
the military sector exceed the potential positive externalities that the defense sector may
have for the civil sector.
A number of channels by which the military spending can inﬂuence the civil economy have
been identiﬁed in the literature. The defense sector can take away skilled labor from civil-
ian production, but can also train workers through provision of education, particularly in
developing economies. It could crowd out resources for consumption and investment, but
it may also provide positive externalities for the civilian sector, like public infrastructure
development, technology spillovers and human capital formation. It can lead to damaging
wars and stipulate civil strife, but may also maintain peace and provide a secure climate for
investment.
The traditional “guns-versus-butter” argument deemed the impact of military expenditure
on output growth to be negative, even though no empirical evidence was presented in this
respect until the seminal contribution by Benoit (1973). This ﬁrst extensive empirical inves-
tigation of the defense-growth nexus found a growth-inducing eﬀect of defense expenditure
and shed new light on the empirical “black spot” in this ﬁeld, resulting in a large number
of studies that consequently tried to assess empirically the growth eﬀect of the military.
Deger and Sen (1995), Ram (1995) and Dunne (1996) provide extensive reviews of the em-
pirical literature, where the diversity as a result of sample selection (cross-country versus
single-country estimates) and methodology are illustrated. Empirical evidence usually tends
to vary across countries and over time and is sensitive to the theoretical framework. At ﬁrst
sight, the results tend to show no positive impact of military spending on economic growth,
even if a supply-side framework (where the potential crowding out eﬀect of defense is usually
disregarded) is used. As Ram (1995) notes, it is nevertheless also diﬃcult to claim that de-
fense outlays have an overall negative eﬀect on growth, since those demand-side studies that
indicate an adverse eﬀect of defense on investment only display a partial view as potential
1The terms defense and military will be used as synonyms throughout the paper.
2(positive) externality eﬀects of the military are not explicitly modelled.
Recently, several authors have postulated the existence of a nonlinear relationship between
defense expenditures and economic growth (see for example Shieh et al, 2002). The notion
that government expenditures in general could aﬀect growth in a nonlinear way has already
been formalized in contributions by Barro (1990) for example. Theoretical results predict a
negative growth eﬀect in countries where government expenditures exceed a certain thresh-
old, resulting in an inverse U-shaped relationship between these two variables. In defense
economics the idea that defense expenditures could have a nonlinear growth eﬀect has re-
cently also become more popular. The contributions of Kinsella (1990), Hooker and Knetter
(1997), Heo (1998), Stroup and Heckelman (2001) Aizenman and Glick (2003) and Crespo
Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2003) are examples of this branch of literature.
This piece of research contributes to the empirical literature on the defense-growth nexus in
several aspects. For a sample of 105 developed and developing countries, the robustness of
the relationship between GDP per capita growth and defense expenditure is assessed using
a generalization of the procedure proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) that allows for
nonlinearity in the underlying econometric speciﬁcation. Given that the results support the
existence of a level-dependent eﬀect of defense spending on growth, a nonlinear version of
the Feder-Ram model is implemented empirically in order to assess the nature of the growth
eﬀect of military expenditure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 evaluates the robustness of the
defense-growth nexus taking account of potential nonlinearities. Section 3 applies a similar
nonlinear modelling strategy to the widely used Feder-Ram model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The defense-growth nexus: Robustness and nonlin-
earity in cross-country growth regressions
This section studies the robustness of military expenditures as a determinant of economic
growth in cross-country growth regressions, taking into account the potential nonlinearity
that may exist between defense spending and growth. The methodology used in order to
tackle the issue of robustness is based on Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b), and has been applied
3to the determinants of economic growth in a more general setting by Crespo Cuaresma
(2002).
2.1 Defense expenditure in cross-country growth regressions
Since the seminal contributions of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Barro (1991), cross-
country growth regressions have been widely used in order to identify variables with a
robust (partial) correlation with GDP per capita growth. The general setting provided
by the Solow-Swan model of economic growth has given rise to the investigation of a vast
amount of economic, social, political and demographic variables to ﬁnd robust correlates of
GDP per capita growth.2 Defense expenditure has been used as an explanatory variable for
economic growth in cross-country growth regressions on many occasions, with mixed results
concerning the size and direction of its eﬀect.
A stereotyped cross-country growth regression that nests practically all the speciﬁcations
aimed at studying the eﬀect of defense expenditure on growth is of the type
yi = ~ βxi + γDi + ~ φzi + εi, (1)
where yi is the growth rate of GDP per capita for country i in the period considered, xi is
a set of variables that are almost unanimously used in most cross country growth regres-
sions (usually those implied by the classical Solow-Swan model: initial GDP per-capita, the
investment share and some measure of educational attainment), Di is a measure of defense
expenditure (usually the ratio of defense spending to GDP), whose eﬀect the scientist is
interested in, and zi is a set of extra conditioning variables. The eﬀect of defense spending
on GDP growth will thus be embodied in ˆ γ, the estimate of γ.
However, the size, sign and signiﬁcance of the estimate of γ in (1) has been found to depend
strongly on the conditioning set zi. As a robustness test to changes in the set of conditioning
variables in growth regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) applied Leamer’s extreme bound
analysis (Leamer, 1983) to the determinants of growth in cross-country growth regressions
such as (1), among them the ratio of defense expenditure to GDP. Their conclusion is that
defense expenditures are not robustly related to economic growth.
2In their survey of the empirics of economic growth, Durlauf and Quah (1999) name more than eighty
variables that have been used at least once in a cross country growth regression.
4An alternative robustness study is provided by Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b). The method-
ology proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) drifts away from the labelling of variables
as ‘robust’ or ‘not robust’, and instead attaches to each variable a level of robustness (in
terms of probability) based on the entire distribution of its parameter estimate for diﬀer-
ent conditioning sets. The group of (95%) robust variables found in Sala-i-Martin (1997a,
1997b), however, does not include the defense expenditure ratio. Nevertheless, as we will
argue below, this result seems to be aﬀected by omitted nonlinearities when modelling the
growth-defense relationship in speciﬁcations such as (1).
2.2 Nonlinearity and robustness in the defense-growth nexus
We will perform a robustness analysis of the defense-growth nexus in cross-country growth
regressions using a generalization of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997a, 1997b) procedure, and the same
dataset. The methodology used in Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) evaluates the robustness
of Di as an explanatory variable in cross country growth regressions of the type given in
(1) as follows. For a given set of ﬁxed variables xi (initial level of GDP per capita, life
expectancy and primary school enrollment, and a constant) and a conditioning set zi, an
OLS estimate of γ, ˆ γ1, and the variance of the estimate, ˆ σ2
γ,1 is obtained. This is repeated
for all possible combinations of conditioning variables (in the basic setting, Sala-i-Martin,
1997a, 1997b, uses 58 conditioning variables in groups of three for zi, which leads to 30,856
estimates of γ and σ2
γ). The robustness level of Di is then calculated for positive estimates
of ¯ ˆ γ = 1/30,856
P
j ˆ γj as the probability mass above zero (below zero for negative estimates





tive robustness levels can be obtained by weighting the individual estimates of γ and σ2
γ
using the relative goodness of ﬁt of the model used to obtained them. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,
1997b) proposes using the ratio of the likelihood of model j over the sum of the likelihood
of all estimated models as a weight for ˆ γjand ¯ ˆ σ2
γ,j in the computation of ¯ ˆ γ and ¯ ˆ σ2
γ. The
empirical distribution of the estimates of γ may also used instead of the normal distribution.
Independently of the method used to calculate the robustness measure, the variable ‘De-
fense Spending Ratio’ does not appear (95%) robust in the results presented in Sala-i-Martin
(1997a, 1997b), although it is very close to robustness if the investment share is included
as a ﬁxed variable in xi. The resulting ¯ ˆ γ is negative both for the weighted and unweighted
averages.
5We will generalize this procedure in order to allow for a level-dependent eﬀect of military
expenditure on economic growth. Our methodology will concentrate on the alternative
piecewise-linear cross-country regression




1 if Di ≤ µ
2 if Di > µ
(3)
that is, the speciﬁcation is piecewise-linear, and the regime n depends upon the level of
defense expenditure. Notice that the linear model (1) is nested in (2)-(3) and can be obtained
just by setting (~ β1 γ1 ~ φ1) = (~ β2 γ2 ~ φ2).
In order to evaluate the robustness of military expenditure as a determinant of economic
growth, equation (1) and its nonlinear counterpart, (2)-(3) are estimated for a given set of
ﬁxed variables, xi and a combination of variables zi. The estimator of µ in (2)-(3) is given
by




that is, the value of Di that minimizes the sum of squared residuals in the nonlinear re-
gression (2)-(3). The estimator b µ is sought among the actually realized values of Di, after
trimming the extremes of the distribution for obvious identiﬁcation reasons.3 Once an esti-
mator for µ has been found, the rest of the parameters in (2)-(3) can be estimated by OLS
in a straightforward manner.
The problem of testing for threshold-nonlinearity of the type presented above has been
widely discussed recently in the econometric literature. The intuition of the test for linear-
ity is extremely simple: just test the null hypothesis of parameter equality across regimes
against the alternative that at least one of the parameters diﬀers between regime 1 and
regime 2. The technical diﬃculty is posed by the fact that, given that the parameter µ is
only identiﬁed under the alternative hypothesis of nonlinearity, standard probability distri-
butions cannot be used in order to evaluate the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic.
In the spirit of Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Hansen (1996, 2000) proposes a bootstrap
3For the properties of this estimator, see e.g. Chan (1993).
6procedure for testing the null of linearity against piecewise-linearity of the threshold type.
The procedure can be summarized as follows: using the estimated linear relationship (1),
artiﬁcial data on the dependent variable (real GDP per-capita growth) is simulated and
both a linear and a piecewise linear model with the estimated threshold are ﬁtted to the
simulated sample. The corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic for the test of parameter
equality across regimes is computed and the procedure is repeated a large number of times,
leading to an approximate distribution of the test statistic under the null of linearity. The
percentage of replicated test statistics that exceed the original value of the test statistic
computed with real data is thus the p-value of the linearity test.
The threshold estimation and linearity testing procedure described above will be used in
the modelling exercise in order to quantify the signiﬁcance of the potential deviation from
linearity of the data given the postulated linear relationship (1). The exercise is carried out
in the following steps: For a given set of conditioning variables zi = (z1 ...zm)0, speciﬁcation
(1) is estimated, as well as the nonlinear speciﬁcation (2)-(3). The estimated parameters
corresponding to defense spending in the linear speciﬁcation (b γ) and in the nonlinear spec-
iﬁcation (b γi,i = 1,2) are stored, together with their estimated variances (b σ2
γ,b σ2
γ1 and b σ2
γ2,
respectively) and the estimated threshold (b µ). For this speciﬁcation of the cross-country
growth regression the bootstrap testing procedure for linearity is carried out, and the result-
ing p-value is stored. The procedure is then repeated for another combination of conditioning
variables, until all possible combinations are tried out. The resulting estimate of γ is the
weighted average value of b γ across all replications of the experiment, and the estimate of σ2
γ
is the weighted average value of b σ2
γ. The estimate of the parameter of Di in each regression
is weighted using the likelihood of the estimated model over the sum of the likelihoods of
all estimated cross-country regressions.4
2.3 Robustness results
The same dataset as in Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) was used for the analysis of the ro-
bustness of military expenditures as an explanatory factor of economic growth. The dataset
includes information on average GDP per capita growth and 63 other economic, political and
4The weighting scheme, similar to the one used in Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b), aims at giving more
importance to those models that ﬁt the data better in terms of sum of squared residuals. Doppelhofer,
Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2000) show that this weighting scheme results as a limiting case of Bayesian model
averaging with diﬀuse priors.
7demographic variables for 105 countries5 in the period 1960-1990. Information on country
coverage and variables is given in Table 1 and Table 2.
Tables 1 and 2 around here
The variable of interest for the robustness analysis is the military spending share, deﬁned
as ‘Public expenditures in defense as a fraction of GDP’. For the study, the three variables
that will be used as ﬁxed regressors, apart from the intercept, are the initial (logged) level of
GDP per capita, initial primary school enrollment and initial life expectancy.6 The vector
of conditioning variables, zi, was constrained to contain two variables in each replication,
and 25% of the distribution of Di was trimmed in each extreme prior to the search of the
threshold estimate. 500 replications were used in the computation of the p-value for the
linearity tests in each round of the robustness experiment.
Table 3 around here
The results of the robustness analysis described above are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst
two columns of Table 3 present the estimates of ¯ ˆ γ and ¯ ˆ σ for the linear and nonlinear speci-
ﬁcations, and the third column presents the probability mass to the left of zero in a normal
distribution centered around the estimate of γ with the corresponding standard deviation.
The (weighted) average estimate of the parameter associated to defense expenditure in the
linear setting appears negative and not robust, with an average estimate of its standard
deviation which is more than four times bigger in absolute value. The value of the de-
fense expenditure ratio corresponding to the (weighted) average estimate of the threshold
is approximately 2%, which divides the sample of countries into two groups of roughly the
same size (of the 105 countries with available defense expenditure data, 54 are in the ‘low’
regime, and 51 are in the ‘high’ regime). The average p-value for the linearity test rejects
the null hypothesis of linearity at the usual 5% signiﬁcance level. The picture arising from
the nonlinear model is very diﬀerent from that of the linear setting: the average estimate
of the parameter in the low regime is extremely robust, negative and more than 75 times
5The dataset is comprised of 138 countries, but only 105 have available data for defense expenditures.
6These variables are also used as ﬁxed regressors for the analysis in Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b). In a
variation of the procedure, Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) also uses the investment share as a ﬁxed regressor.
Due to the potential endogeneity of this variable, we decided not to use it as part of xi.
8higher in absolute value than the average estimate in the linear model. Defense expenditure
does not appear robustly related to growth in the high regime. Notice that these results
do not support the inverse U-shaped relationship between military spending and growth,
and actually contradict the results that Stroup and Heckelman (2001) obtain for Africa and
Latin America.
The results point towards a level-dependent eﬀect of defense expenditure on economic
growth: while there is evidence of a robust negative partial correlation between military
expenditure and growth for countries with a low level of defense expenditure over GDP
(relative to the endogenously estimated threshold), the defense-growth nexus is not robust
for countries with higher levels of defense spending. The next section will aim at analyz-
ing the nature of this asymmetric eﬀect of defense expenditure on growth by estimating a
piecewise-linear version of the widely used Feder-Ram model.
3 Evidence from a nonlinear Feder-Ram model
Given the results of the robustness exercise, this section establishes empirically the relation-
ship between defense expenditures and growth using the Feder-Ram model (Feder, 1983;
Biswas and Ram, 1986), taking account of potential nonlinearities in the defense-growth
nexus. The popularity of this theoretical setting in defense economics may be explained
because of its ability to explicitly treat externality eﬀects of the defense on the civil sec-
tor.7 The model is a two-sector neoclassical growth model with an economy composed of
a civilian and a defense sector, and it allows the defense sector to be treated as one sector
in the economy and the size eﬀect of the sector and its diﬀerential productivity eﬀect to be
distinguished. The model will be presented and the theoretical relationship between GDP
growth and defense spending will then be estimated, allowing for level dependence in the
eﬀects of military spending on growth.
3.1 The Feder-Ram model: A piecewise-linear speciﬁcation
Assume that the economy is composed of two sectors, the defense and the civilian sector.
Let real output in the defense sector at time t be D(t), and that in the civilian sector be
C(t). Furthermore, let us assume that labor (L(t)) and capital (K(t)) are the only inputs
7For a critique of the Feder-Ram model, see Dunne, Smith and Willenboeckel (2001).
9in each sector, that the relative marginal products of labor and capital may diﬀer across the
two sectors and that the size of the defense sector output (D(t)) may act as an externality
factor for the civilian sector




where the lower case subscripts c and d denote sectoral inputs (L(t) = Lc(t) + Ld(t) and
K(t) = Kc(t)+Kd(t)), and total output in the economy (Y (t)) is the sum of output in both
sectors. The marginal productivities of the factors of production – labor and capital – in
the defense sector may not be the same as in the civilian sector.8 Allowance is made for this
by assuming that the marginal productivity of factors used in the defense sector is equal to






= (1 + δ), δ > −1
where the subscripts l and k refer to marginal products (assumed constant). If δ is positive,
factors of production have a larger marginal productivity in the defense sector and vice versa
if δ is negative. If δ is zero, marginal productivities are equal across the two sectors.
















8Defense production is not completely physically separate from civilian production because a large portion
of defense supplies and equipment is used for defense purposes. The distinction between defense and civilian
sectors is a theoretical diﬀerence. Empirically, civilian output or spending is just the diﬀerence between real
output and defense spending, C(t) = Y (t) − D(t).
10where α = CK,φ = CL and ϕ = (δ/(1 + δ) + Cd). However, this speciﬁcation only allows
us to test empirically whether both Cd and δ are zero at the same time. In order to be able
to test independently the signiﬁcance of each parameter, the further assumption that the
eﬀect of defense expenditure on the civilian sector has constant elasticity needs to be made.
This implies a production function in the civil sector such as
C(t) = D(t)θΨ(Lc(t),Kc(t)),


















where $ = δ/(1 + δ) − θ can be interpreted as the size eﬀect of military expenditure on
economic growth. This parametrization allows us to identify the structural parameters, θ
(the externality parameter) and δ (the productivity diﬀerential parameter).
The empirical application will imply estimating the linear speciﬁcation of the Feder-Ram
model, both in the form of (4) and (5), and its nonlinear alternative, where both the exter-
nality and the productivity diﬀerential eﬀect are allowed to diﬀer depending on the overall






































Y (t) ≤ µ
2 if
D(t)
Y (t) > µ
(8)
The speciﬁcation assumes that the level of military expenditure determines the size (and,
eventually, the existence) of both the inter-sectoral externality eﬀect and the productivity
diﬀerential between the military and civil sector.9
9A more general speciﬁcation would allow the potential breakpoint to diﬀer across structural parameters.
113.2 Empirical results
The linear (4) and (5) and nonlinear models (6) and (7) are estimated using data for 108
countries in the period 1985–1997.10 The sample includes both developed and developing
countries. The variables are averages in the period considered, as we are interested in po-
tential eﬀects of defense expenditures on long run growth. Table 4 presents the results of
the OLS estimation of model (4) and its nonlinear counterpart (6).11 In principle, it could
be suspected that some of the right hand side variables are endogenous in the speciﬁcation
given by (4). Instrumental variable estimation of (4) was carried out using initial levels of
investment, openness, military expenditure and GDP per capita as instruments. Although
the Sargan test could not reject the validity of these instruments, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test statistic gave evidence in favour of OLS estimation.12
Tables 4 and 5 around here
The estimates corresponding to α and φ are highly signiﬁcant and positive for both models,
and in the range of values usually reported in the literature. The estimate of the eﬀect of
military expenditure on GDP growth in the linear model is positive and not signiﬁcant. The
residuals of the linear model present signiﬁcant deviations from normality and homoskedas-
ticity according, respectively, to the Jarque-Bera and White test. The likelihood ratio test
proposed by Hansen (1996) rejects the null of linearity at all reasonable signiﬁcance levels,
and the parameter estimates associated to defense spending in the nonlinear model oﬀer
a very diﬀerent picture of the defense-growth nexus. The threshold level in the nonlin-
ear model is estimated to be around 3.25%, which divides the sample into a ‘low regime’
subsample, formed by 72 countries (those with a level of military expenditure over GDP
below the estimated threshold level) and a ‘high regime’ subsample of 36 countries. Table
5 presents the identity of the countries in each group. In the lower regime, the parameter
Given that the estimated thresholds for this speciﬁcation using the data available were not distinguishable
from each other (in the sense of overlapping 95% conﬁdence intervals calculated following the method
proposed in Hansen, 1996), we assume them to be located at the same value.
10The source of the data used for the estimations in this section is the World Development Indicators
Database (World Bank) for the military expenditure ratio, investment share and population growth, and
the Penn World Tables, Mark 5 (Summers and Heston, 2002) for GDP growth. The reason for not using the
same data as in the previous section is that there is no data available for the growth of military expenditures
in the Sala-i-Martin dataset.
11All estimations include a constant, which is not reported.
12The results from the estimation using instrumental variables are available from the authors upon request.
12corresponding to the eﬀect of military expenditures on GDP growth is negative, signiﬁcant
and much higher in absolute value than the estimate of the linear model. The positive
parameter associated to military expenditure for the subsample of countries with a defense
spending ratio higher than 3.25% is positive and only marginally signiﬁcant (the p-value
corresponding to the t-statistic from ψ2 is 0.099). There is, thus, evidence of a negative
eﬀect of military expenditure on growth for countries with low levels of military expenditure
(with respect to the endogenously estimated ratio of 3.25%). The evidence concerning the
existence of a (positive) eﬀect for countries with higher levels of military expenditure is very
limited. We thus estimate the extended Feder-Ram model given by equation (7) in order to
be able to distinguish a size and a growth eﬀect. Notice as well that both the null hypothesis
of normal distribution and homoskedasticity in the residuals cannot be rejected at the 5%
signiﬁcance level in the nonlinear model. This can be seen as evidence that the failure of the
model given by (5) in rendering ’white’ residuals is due to the omission of level-dependent
nonlinearity in the relationship between defense spending and growth.
Table 6 around here
In order to investigate the nature of this asymmetric growth eﬀect of military expenditure
on growth, equations (5) and (7) were estimated. The threshold was estimated again for
speciﬁcation (7), yielding a similar value as for (6). The division of countries in regimes is,
thus, the same as given in Table 5. The parameter estimates and other test statistics of the
regression are shown in Table 6.13
The estimates corresponding to α and φ are, again, highly signiﬁcant and positive for both
models. The estimate of the size and the growth eﬀect of military expenditure on GDP
growth in the linear model are both not signiﬁcant. The likelihood ratio test proposed by
Hansen (1996) rejects the null of linearity at all reasonable signiﬁcance levels. The threshold
level in the nonlinear model is also estimated to be around 3.25%, leading to the same sub-
samples presented in Table 5. Notice that the residuals of the nonlinear model cannot reject
the null of homoskedasticity using White’s test, while there is evidence of heteroskedasticity
13A double threshold model, where the data was divided into three regimes according to the level of the
military expenditure share, was also tried. The values of the defense spending share that jointly minimized
the sum of squared residuals for the two-threshold model where 1.04% and 3.25%, but Hansen (1996)’s test
could not reject at the usual 5% signiﬁcance level that the proper speciﬁcation is the one with a single
threshold. The results of the three-regime model are available from the authors upon request.
13in the linear model. This oﬀers extra statistical evidence concerning the superiority of the
nonlinear model over the linear setting.
In the lower regime, the parameter corresponding to the size eﬀect of military expendi-
tures on GDP growth is negative and highly signiﬁcant. The point estimate of δ based on
the results for the low regime is approximately -0.91, indicating that factors of production
have a larger marginal productivity (on average) in the civil sector for the corresponding
subsample. The externality eﬀect (reﬂected in the parameters θ1 and θ2) is signiﬁcantly
positive only for the low regime, and not signiﬁcant for the high regime. This result can
be reconciled with a concave functional form for the indirect eﬀects of defense on growth
such as the one behind the model by Stroup and Heckelman (2001), but the productivity
eﬀect renders the net eﬀect for those countries below the estimated threshold negative. No
signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerential or externality eﬀect is found for the group of countries
in the high regime.
Surprisingly, in the subset of countries where the basic externalities provided by the mili-
tary sector seem to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on output growth, the productivity
diﬀerential between the defense and civilian sector renders the average net eﬀect of increases
in defense production on growth negative. It is thus the size eﬀect of military expenditure
that accounts for the results found in the robustness exercise in the previous section of this
paper.
4 Conclusions
This piece of research presents evidence concerning the eﬀect of defense expenditures on
economic growth for two datasets including more than a hundred developing and developed
countries. A robustness analysis allowing for nonlinear eﬀects of military expenditure on
GDP per capita growth for the period 1960-1990 ﬁnds evidence of a robust negative par-
tial correlation between military expenditures and growth for countries with relatively low
levels of defense expenditure share with respect to an endogenously estimated threshold.
Using a dataset that includes more recent observations, we found additional evidence for a
level-dependent eﬀect of defense spending on growth and were also able to shed light on the
sources of the negative growth eﬀect of military expenditures on growth for the subsample
of countries with a low military burden.
14The results indicate that the negative productivity diﬀerential between the military and
civilian sector in the subsample of “low military spending” countries accounts for the neg-
ative partial correlation between the share of defense expenditures and economic growth.
However, it is only in these countries where the potential externality eﬀect of the military
sector seems to play a role in terms of contribution to GDP growth, although the (average)
net eﬀect is negative due to the size eﬀect. Given the lower productivity of the defense
sector and given that downsizing the defense sector, the logic implication of our empirical
ﬁnding, may be unrealistic due to political reasons, one feasible alternative may be to raise
productivity in the defense sector. This could, at least partly, allow to reap some beneﬁts
for the civil sector.
Both the robustness exercise and the estimation results of the Feder-Ram model present
overwhelming statistical evidence that the use of linear models can lead to a distorted
picture of the defense-growth nexus. Hence nonlinear models are bound to replicate better
the stylized facts underlying the relationship between defense spending and economic growth.
Although the simple Feder-Ram model that was estimated in this piece of research gives a
clear indication of the nature of the negative eﬀect of military expenditures on growth, other
theoretical frameworks concentrating on institutional or political variables may as well serve
to give complementary explanations of the asymmetry .
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18Table 1: Country coverage for the robustness analysis
Algeria Finland Madagascar Singapore
Argentina France Malawi South africa
Australia Gabon Malaysia Spain
Austria Germany, West Mali Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Ghana Mauritania Sudan
Belgium Greece Mauritius Sweden
Benin Guatemala Mexico Switzerland
Bolivia Guinea Morocco Syria
Brazil Guyana Myanmar (Burma) Taiwan
Burkina Faso Haiti Nepal Tanzania
Burundi Honduras Netherlands Thailand
Cameroon Hong Kong New Zealand Togo
Canada India Nicaragua Trinidad & Tobago
Cent’l Afr. Rep. Indonesia Niger Tunisia
Chad Iran, I.R. of Nigeria Turkey
Chile Iraq Norway Uganda
Colombia Ireland Pakistan United Kingdom
Congo Israel Panama United States
Costa Rica Italy Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Cote d’Ivoire Jamaica Paraguay Venezuela
Cyprus Japan Peru Yugoslavia
Denmark Jordan Philippines Zaire
Dominican Rep. Kenya Portugal Zambia
Ecuador Korea Rwanda Zimbabwe
Egypt Kuwait Saudi Arabia
El Salvador Liberia Senegal
Ethiopia Luxembourg Sierra Leone
19Table 2: Variables used in the robustness analysis
Absolute Lattitude. Barro (1996)
Area (Scale Eﬀect). Barro and Lee (1993). Total area of the country.
Average Inﬂation Rate 1960-90. Levine and Renelt (1992)
Average Years of Higher Schooling. Barro and Lee (1993)
Average Years of Primary Schooling in 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Average Years of Schooling. Barro and Lee (1993)
Average Years of Secondary Schooling. Barro and Lee (1993)
Black Market Premium. Barro and Lee (1993) [log (1+Black Market Premium)]
British Colony Dummy. Barro (1996)
Civil Liberties Index. Knack and Keefer (1995)
Defense Spending Share. Barro and Lee (1993)
Degree of Capitalism Index. Hall and Jones (1996)
Equipment Investment. Delong and Summers (1991)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index. Easterly and Levine (1997)
Exchange Rate Distortions. Levine and Renelt (1992)
Fraction of Buddhists. Barro (1996)
Fraction of Catholics. Barro (1996)
Fraction of Confucius. Barro (1996)
Fraction of GDP in Mining. Hall and Jones (1996)
Fraction of Hindu. Barro (1996)
Fraction of Jewish. Barro (1996)
Fraction of Muslims. Barro (1996)
Fraction of Population Able to Speak a Foreign Language. Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b)
Fraction of Population Able to Speak English. Hall and Jones (1996)
Fraction of Protestants. Barro (1996)
Free Trade Openness. Barro and Lee (1993)
French Colony Dummy. Barro (1996)
Growth of Domestic Credit 1960-90. Levine and Renelt (1992)
Growth Rate of GDP per capita 1960-90. Penn World Tables, Summer and Heston (1991);
Growth Rate of Population 1960-90. Barro and Lee (1993)
Higher Education Enrollment, 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Index of Democracy as of 1965. Knack and Keefer (1995)
Latin American Dummy. Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b)
Life Expectancy in 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Liquid Liabilities to GDP Ratio. King and Levine (1993)
20Table 2 (continued): Variables used in the robustness analysis
Log(GDP per capita 1960). Barro and Lee (1993)
Non-Equipment Investment. Delong and Summers (1991)
Number of Years Open Economy. Sachs and Warner (1996)
Outward Orientation Index. Levine and Renelt (1992)
Political Assassinations. Barro and Lee (1993)
Political Instability Index. Knack and Keefer (1995)
Political Rights Index. Barro (1996)
Primary Exports Share in Total Exports. Sachs and Warner (1996)
Primary School Enrollment in 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Product of average years of schooling and GDP per capita in 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Public Consumption Share. Barro and Lee (1993)
Public Education Spending Share. Barro and Lee (1993)
Public Investment Share. Barro and Lee (1993)
Ratio of Workers to Population. Barro and Lee (1993)
Revolutions and Coups. Barro and Lee (1993)
Rule of Law Index. Barro (1996)
Secondary School Enrollment in 1960. Barro and Lee (1993)
Size Labor Force (Scale Eﬀect). Barro and Lee (1993)
Spanish Colony Dummy. Barro (1996)
Standard Deviation of Domestic Credit 1960-90. King and Levine (1993)
Standard Deviation of Inﬂation 1960-90. Levine and Renelt (1992)
Standard Deviation of the Black Market Premium 1960-89. Levine & Renelt (1992)
Sub-Sahara African Dummy. Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b)
Tariﬀ Restrictions Degree. Barro and Lee (1993)
Terms of Trade Growth 1960-90. Barro and Lee (1993)
Urbanization Rate. Barro and Lee (1993)
War Dummy. Barro and Lee (1993)
21Table 3: Robustness and nonlinearity analysis: Defense expenditure ratio
Linear Speciﬁcation
¯ ˆ γ ¯ ˆ σγ P(γ < 0|¯ ˆ γ, ¯ ˆ σγ)
-0.0115 0.0505 0.5898
Nonlinear Speciﬁcation
¯ ˆ γk ¯ ˆ σγk P(γk < 0|¯ ˆ γk, ¯ ˆ σγk)
k = 1 -0.8451 0.3718 0.9885
k = 2 -0.0467 0.0650 0.7639
b µ 0.0197
Average p-value 0.0205
22Table 4: Linear and nonlinear Feder-Ram models: estimates
Linear Model Nonlinear Model
















J-B test stat. 6.1419 4.3984
White test stat. 27.2255 21.1355
Linearity test stat. 10.4180 (p-value: 0.004)
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signiﬁcant. An intercept was included in both speciﬁcations, but
is not reported. The J-B test statistic refers to the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, χ2(2)
distributed under the null of normally distributed residuals. The White test statistic refers to White’s
TR2 test for heteroskedasticity, χ2(9) distributed under the null of homoskedasticity for the linear
model and χ2(14) distributed under the null of homoskedasticity for the nonlinear model. The p-value
of the linearity test is computed using 500 bootstrap replications. The threshold estimate was sought
in the central 50% of the empirical distribution of the defense expenditure ratio over GDP variable.
23Table 5: Subsamples in the Feder-Ram nonlinear model











Brazil Moldava Great Britain




China New Zealand Jordania
Colombia Nigeria Korea, Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep. Norway Lebanon
Costa Rica Panama Lesotho
Cote d’Ivoire Papua New Guinea Morocco
Czech Rep. Paraguay Nicaragua
Denmark Peru Pakistan
Dominican Rep. Phillipines Poland
Ecuador Portugal Romania
Estonia Sierra Leone Russia
Fiji Slovakia Rwanda
Finland Spain Singapur
Gabon Sweden South Africa
Germany Switzerland Sri Lanka
Ghana Thailand Syria
Guinea Togo Turkey
Guinea-Bissau Trinidad and Tobago Uganda




24Table 6: Production Function Approach: Nonlinear Speciﬁcation
Linear Model Nonlinear Model







ω 1.3474 (1.1942) –
θ -0.0611 (0.0548) –
ω1 – -9.9388
∗∗∗(3.053)








J-B test stat. 3.7107 5.5255
White test stat. 28.0248 28.4266
Linearity test stat. 13.350 (p-value: 0.002)
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signiﬁcant. An intercept was included in both speciﬁcations, but
is not reported. The J-B test statistic refers to the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, χ2(2)
distributed under the null of normally distributed residuals. The White test statistic refers to White’s
TR2 test for heteroskedasticity, χ2(14) distributed under the null of homoskedasticity for the linear
model and χ2(23) distributed under the null of homoskedasticity for the nonlinear model. The p-value
of the linearity test is computed using 500 bootstrap replications. The threshold estimate was sought
in the central 50% of the empirical distribution of the defense expenditure ratio over GDP variable.
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